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TORT REMEDIES FOR INCESTUOUS 
ABUSE 
The disquieting phenomenon of sexual contact between fa-
ther and daughter is the subject of increasing study. One esti-
mate of the current incidence of incestuous abuse indicates that 
approximately one million American women have been its vic-
tims and that annually, an additional 16,000 girls are similarly 
victimized. 1 Sexual contact between father and daughterZ occurs 
without the daughter's consent, customarily lasts several months 
to several years, and usually results in psychological trauma to 
the daughter, the symptoms of which can be severe and long 
lasting. Historically, the law has offered little meaningful redress 
to incestuously abused daughters. Prosecution of the offending 
parent has proved largely unsatisfactory. Daughters seldom re-
port the crime,8 making remote the possibility that fathers will 
be brought to trial. The possbility of conviction is even more 
chimeric.· As a result, women have begun to seek civil redress 
1. D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 88 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
FINKELHOR]. The author bases his estimate on the results of five studies, including his 
own, conducted between 1940 and 1978 in which women were asked to report any early 
sexual experiences with adults. The results of his study form the basis of his book. Other 
experts suggest that father-daughter incest may occur far more frequently than 
Finkelhor's estimate would indicate. See J. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 14 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as HERMAN]; S. BUTLER, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE 12-15 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as BUTLER]. Regardless of exact numbers, all are in agreement that the problem 
is serious and wide-spread. 
2. Although incest occurs between family members other than father and daughter, 
(FINKELHOR, supra note I, at 87) it is this latter which is most frequently reported and 
studied, and which will be the focus of this Comment. 
3. HERMAN, supra note I, at 163-64. The primary reason why a daughter will refrain 
from reporting her father's conduct results from fear of the possible consequences. See 
infra text accompanying notes 34-49. A father will warn his daughter that reporting can 
lead to his trial, conviction, and imprisonment. Not surprisingly, a daughter will usually 
choose to endure repeated sexual contact with her father rather than expose her family 
to these possibilities. 
4. See, e.g., V. DE FRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES COMMIT-
TED BY ADULTS 269-76 (1968) in which follow ups on 250 police reports of sexual assaults 
on children in New York City revealed that only nine percent of the adult male assail-
ants were eventually sentenced to prison. This marginal conviction rate is explained in 
large part by the father's role as defendant in a criminal proceeding. He is guaranteed a 
full panoply of constitutional protections, including the right to confront his accusers in 
a public trial and the right to cross examine any witness against him. As one author 
points out, "[t]hese safeguards, designed for adversary proceedings between adults, give 
an enormous advantage to the defendant, where the only witness for the prosecution is a 
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for injuries inflicted by incestuous abuse. 
This Comment explores the problem of incestuous abuse be-
tween father and daughter, traditional tort theories available to 
the incest victim/survivorl!, defenses fathers might raise, and the 
availability of punitive damages to the incest victim/survivor. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. DEFINITION 
Incest is variously defined. Legal and dictionary definitions 
generally reflect societal proscription of marriage within certain 
degrees of consanguinity.6 However, recent definitions formu-
lated by clinicians focus on the scope and nature of the incestu-
ous behavior itself and its consequences.7 A much broader range 
note I, at 164-65. 
Because most fathers, unless restricted by the court, have free access to their fami-
lies during the pendency of the trial, tremendous pressure is brought to bear on the 
daughter to recant. If the daughter succeeds in withstanding this pressure, she must still 
undergo the ordeal of describing in detail the sexual contact between her and her father 
in public, before a battery of legal personnel, most likely to be men unsympathetic to 
her. [d. at 165-66. It is no wonder that when faced with prospects such as these, so few 
victims seek prosecutional redress. 
5. Integral to a woman's recovery from the effects of incestuous abuse is the trans-
formation in self image from that of "victim" to that of "survivor." This is best charac-
terized as a process whereby the woman directly confronts the incest experience, and the 
hurt and anger engendered by it, and seeks to understand rather than avoid the experi-
ence and its effects. As a result of this process, women develop more positive self images, 
and thus become better able to extricate themselves from the pattern of repeated victim-
ization to which incest victims are particularly susceptible. HERMAN, supra note I, at 
178-79, 189-92, and 198-201. 
6. "Sexual intercourse or interbreeding between closely related individuals esp. [sic] 
when they are related or regarded as related (as by reason of affinity or membership in a 
tribal kinship, group, or clan) within degrees wherein marriage is prohibited by law or 
custom." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 141 
(1976). California's statutory definition of incest is predicated upon marriage and reads 
"[m]arriages between parents and children, ancestors and descendants of every degree, 
and between brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole blood, and between 
uncles and nieces or aunts and nephews, are incestuous, and void from the beginning, 
whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4400 (West 
1970). 
7. The following are three recent definitions of incest formulated by three different 
clinicians. "[A]ny [physical contact] between a child and an adult in a position. of pater-
nal authority ... that has to be kept a secret." HERMAN, supra note I, at 70. "[S]exual 
contact between family members including not just intercourse but also mutual mastur-
bation, hand-genital or oral-genital contact, sexual fondling, exhibition, and even sexual 
propositioning." FINKELHOR, supra note I, at 84. "Any manual, oral, or genital sexual 
contact or other explicit sexual behavior that an adult family member imposes on a child 
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of sexual contact than sexual intercourse alone is included in 
such definitions. As a result, they are more expansive than typi-
cal dictionary or legal definitions. More importantly, they ac-
count for behavior which to the adult male offender may seem 
innocuous, but to the female child victim is as obnoxious as sex-
ual intercourse. As one commentator indicates: 
From the point of view of the adult male, sexual 
activity that stops short of penile penetration is 
often described as "unconsummated", as though 
somehow it does not "count". But from a psycho-
logical point of view, especially from the child's 
point of view, the sexual motivation of the con-
tact, and the fact that it must be kept secret, are 
far more significant than the exact nature of the 
act itself.S 
Because this Comment focuses on civil redress for injuries 
sustained by victims of incestuous abuse, this latter perspective 
is critical. Therefore, for the purposes of bringing a civil action, 
incestuous abuse will be defined as any sexual contact between a 
male adult and a female child over whom he exercises paternal 
authority, and which results in physical, psychological, or sexual 
trauma to the child. "Sexual trauma" is defined as any physical 
contact which must be kept secret.9 
B. THE INCESTUOUS FAMILY 
Recent research indicates that incestuous abuse is most 
likely to occur in rigidly patriarchal families. 10 In these families, 
the father exerts immense control over his wife and daughters, 
virtually isolating them from the outside world.ll He is often 
physically abusive but is careful not to exceed limits beyond 
which outside intervention would be inevitable.12 Although 
which ... resuits in emotional, physical, or sexual trauma." BUTLER, supra note 1, at 4-
5. 
8. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 70. 
9. Secrecy ill an essential element of incestuous abuse. See infra text accompanying 
notes 34-49. 
10. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 54-57. 
11. This paternal "supervision" becomes especially acute for the daughter when she 
reaches adolescence. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 91. Her father is likely to become in-
tensely jealous, forbidding her to date, wear make-up or exhibit other behavior indicative 
of a desire to establish independent relationships with men. [d. 
12. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 29. If the father is to preserve his despotic rule at 
home, it is imperative that his behavior appear "normal" to outsiders. Should he beat his 
3
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feared at home, he may be perceived as weak or insecure 
outside. I3 He is careful to dominate only in those situations 
where he meets with little, if any, resistance.14 Of most signifi-
cance is the father's exercise of male prerogative within the 
home. He expects his wife to serve him, and should she fail to do 
so to his satisfaction, he views it as his right to extract similar 
service from his daughter, including sex. III Indeed, many such fa-
thers regard it as an exercise of parental privilege to introduce 
their daughters to sex. IS If confronted with the incest, the fa-
ther's first response is denial.17 If disbelieved, he blames his 
wife's frigidity and/or his daughter's seductiveness.I8 Only when 
faced with trial and possible imprisonment are fathers likely to 
admit their wrongdoing. 18 
wife or daughter to the extent that medical attention is required, he has exposed himself 
to the certainty that his abuse will be discovered, and possibly curtailed, by outsiders. 
Thus, in the words of one commentator, "[thel violence, though terrifying to the mothers 
and children, did not exceed certain clear limits .... In this, as in many other aspects 
of family life, [fathers) seemed exquisitely sensitive to the bounds of the male preroga-
tive, and did not exceed the socially condoned limits of violence." HERMAN, supra note I, 
at 74. 
13. Raphaling, Carpenter and Davis, Incest: A Genealogical Study, ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 505 (1967). Again, this chameleon like quality of incestuously abusive fathers 
to exhibit a shifting wolf/sheep identity is based on their need to hide their conduct at 
home from the outside world lest someone find out and put a stop to their abusive be-
havior. Fathers monitor their relative power in any situation and adjust their behavior 
accordingly. Hence, "[i)n the presence of men much more powerful than themselves, 
such as police, prosecutors, therapists and researchers, the fathers knew how to present 
themselves as pathetic, helpless and confused .... Face to face with men of equal or 
superior authority, they become engaging and submissive." HERMAN, supra note I, at 74-
76. Note that the group of men to which the father presents a confused, pathetic image is 
that group which is charged with protecting his daughter from him. By presenting such a 
sympathetic, even pitiful, demeanor to the world, the father ensures that his daughter's 
story will not be believed should she turn to these authorities for assistance. 
14. HERMAN, supra note I, at 76. 
15. Id. at 79 and 83. 
16. Raphaling, Carpenter, and Davis, supra note 13, at 506. 
17. HERMAN, supra note I, at 22. 
18. Id. at 42-49. Husbands claim that their wives failed to perform their marital 
duties, forced their daughters to assume the role of surrogate wife and tolerated the 
incest. As to their daughters, fathers characterize them as seductive, maintaining that 
they initiated, or at least consented to, the incestuous contact. The fathers' claims are 
substantially corroborated in the literature on the subject of incest, from medical trea-
tises to pornography. It is perhaps not idle speculation to suggest that because most such 
literature is written by men, much of it for men, the corroboration found therein pro-
vides a convenient scapegoat for the "brother" whose sexual contact with his daughter is 
questioned. In such fashion is the male prerogative to demand sexual service from 
women in general, and daughters in particular, preserved for all men. Id. 
19. Id. at 171. 
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In stark contrast to their husbands, mothers in incestuously 
abusive families are virtually powerless. Because birthrates in 
these families are higher than the norm,20 the mothers are often 
overburdened with multiple pregnancies21 and the subsequent 
care of their children, in which their husbands do not share.22 
Mothers are discouraged from participating in activities outside 
the home by their husbands,23 on whom they are completely de-
pendent for financial support.24 A common experience for these 
mothers, the significance of which cannot be underestimated, is 
disabling illness resulting frequently in their hospitalization or 
in their living as an invalid at home.211 These illnesses render the 
mothers unable to fulfill their responsibilities at home, but their· 
husbands do not assume these responsibilities themselves. In-
stead their daughters are expected to do SO.26 Once the mother 
becomes unable to provide a strong, competent influence at 
home, the possibility that her daughter will be incestuously 
abused increases dramatically.27 If she learns of the incest, the 
mother perceives tolerance of it as her only choice.28 Powerless 
20. One study found that imprisoned incestuous fathers reported an average of 5.1 
children per family. Cavallin, Incestuous Fathers: A Clinical Report, 122 AM. J. PSYCHI-
ATRY 1132, 1134 (1966). In a study copducted in Ireland, incestuous families were re-
ported to have an average of 6 or 7 children as compared with a country average of 4.5. 
N. Lukianowicz, Incest, 120 BRIT. J. PSY<;HIATRY 301, 303 (1972). 
21. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 11. Although some daughters report that their mothers 
wanted large families, frequently, the pregnancies were imposed on the wives. One 
daughter commented that her father "felt, if you're going to have sex you have to have 
the child. And he was the type of man who would say, if I can't get it from my wife, I'll 
go elsewhere. He's also the type of man where, if she didn't want to open her legs, he'd 
pinch her thighs." Id. 
22. Id. at 54. Typically, an absolute division of labor prevails in incestuously abusive 
homes such that husbands provide financial support while wives care for the children 
and the house. Id. 
23. Id. at 73. One daughter reported that although her mother worked prior to mar-
rying her father, when she married and moved to Vermont, her husband told her not to 
work or drive because it was too cold and dangerous. The mother never worked or drove 
again.Id. 
24. Id. at 72. 
25. FINKELHOR, supra note 1, at 125. Although the cause of these illnesses is often 
unclear, one commentator suggests that in many cases, it is a direct result of multiple 
pregnancies. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 77. 
26. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 79. The author notes that the fathers react to their 
wives' illnesses as though they, along with the children, are being deprived of mothering. 
Because they perceive themselves as the family providers, they consider it their right to 
be nurtured at home "if not by their wives, then by their daughters." Id. 
27. Id. at 48. The author comments "[ilt appears ... that only a strong alliance 
with a healthy mother offers a girl a modicum of protection from sexual abuse." See also 
FINKELHOR, supra note 1, at 148. 
28. One must not succumb to the temptation of blaming the mother for her failure 
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to protect herself, she is in no position to protect her daughter.29 
The role of "little mother" in the family places the daughter 
in a unique and unenviable position. She is called upon to per-
form major household tasks, to mediate her parents' quarrels 
and to listen patiently to her father's complaints about her 
mother.30 Her own needs for affectionate attention from her 
mother are unmet, a source of profound disappointment to her.31 
The special alliance created between her and her father provides 
her with the only affectionate attention she receives from either 
parent.32 Finally, in order to keep the family together, the 
daughter feels obligated to fulfill the role with which she is bur-
dened.33 Given the foregoing, one readily comprehends why the 
daughter feels she must comply when her father chooses to de-
mand sexual services from her. 
C. THE ROLE OF SECRECY 
Sexual contact between father and daughter can commence 
anytime between the daughter's infancy and her adolescence, 
but on the average it begins when she is nine years 01d.34 From 
then until the time she leaves home, her father seeks sexual con-
tact with her at every opportunity.31i In order to ensure her 
to intervene on her daughter's behalf. She fears that intervention will provoke her hus-
band's anger or perhaps induce him to desert the family. She has minimal ability to 
provide financially or emotionally for herself or her children. In addition, she considers 
her first loyalty to be to her husband and her marriage. If maintaining these requires the 
sexual sacrifice of her daughter, she will not protest. Should one regard this behavior as 
maternal collusion in the incest, one must also remember that "[mjaternal collusion in 
incest, when it occurs, is a measure of maternal powerlessness." HERMAN, supra note 1, 
at 49. 
29. Reporting results from a study she conducted, the author observed 
"[ejconomically dependent, socially isolated, in poor health, and encumbered with the 
care of many small children, these mothers were in no position to challenge their hus-
bands' domination or to resist their abuses." [d. at 78. 
30. Daughters can be quite young when they are pressed into service. Close to half 
of the participants in one study were under ten years old. [d. at 79. 
31. [d. at 81. 
32. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 31. 
33. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 80. The daughter's worst fear is that her father will 
desert the family and her mother will fall apart completely. [d. In fact, her perception is 
not unfounded. The author's research indicates that in several families the father de-
serted when the daughters left home. [d. at 94. 
34. [d. at 83. 
35. [d. at 85. The author reports that although daughters invent myriad excuses to 
avoid sexual contact with their fathers, the fathers are persistent. [d. at 87. Commenting 
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availability to him, the father enjoins his daughter to secrecy. 
This is most often accomplished with threats of dire conse-
quences should she disclose his behavior to anyone.36 She is told, 
for example, that her father will be imprisoned, her mother will 
suffer a nervous breakdown, or that she herself will be sent 
away.37 Her father's threats thus reinforce her fear that unless 
she complies with his demands, the family will split up. 
Despite her fear of the consequences, the daughter longs to 
break secrecy. She is most anxious that her mother should le~rn 
of the incest in order that she come to her daughter's rescue.38 
Unable to tell her mother directly, as a young child, the daugh-
ter develops identifiable symptoms of distress clinicians have 
come to recognize as characteristic of victims of incestuous 
abuse.39 These include nightmares, evidence of fear and with-
drawal, and complaints of abdominal pains.40 Some girls exhibit 
ritualized sexual behavior such as unzipping men's pants.41 If 
the daughter does confide in her mother, the response she re-
ceives is often disappointing. In order to protect her marriage, 
the mother indicates unequivocally that her husband's needs 
take priority over her daughter's42 and, therefore, she makes no 
attempt to stop the incestuous abuse. 
As the daughter approaches puberty, her father's sexual de-
mands are likely to become intolerable.43 Fathers who haven't 
yet done so may attempt sexual intercourse." This additional 
stress can precipitate disclosure.411 Unfortunately, outsiders to 
on her research results, the author states "[i)n no case was the incestuous relationship 
ended by the father. The daughters put a stop to the sexual contact as soon as they 
could, by whatever means they could. [d. at 95. 
36. BUTLER, supra note I, at 32-33. 




41. The woman who reported this behavior to the author was five years old when 
she began approaching male acquaintances and unzipping their pants. Another author 
describes encounters between a counselor and an eight year old girl. "[She) would con-
stantly find reasons to come into my office and would rub herself suggestively and sexu-
ally against my leg, looking up into my face all the while." BUTLER, supra note I, at 37. 
42. HERMAN, supra note I, at 89. See supra text accompanying notes 20-29. 
43. Id. at 91·92. 
44. Id. at 131. 
45. Id. at 92. The daughter might run away or seek placement in a foster home or 
admission to a residential school. 
7
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whom the daughter appeals usually misunderstand, disbelieve, 
or punish her.48 Until quite recently, this has been true even of 
professionals charged with the duty to protect victims of inces- . 
tuous abuse.47 Ignorance and a natural aversion to incest cause 
them to abdicate that responsibility. In addition, they, along 
with most of society, are loath to challenge the male prerogative 
to behave as he pleases in his own home.48 This near universal 
societal refusal to respond appropriately to incestuous abuse 
punishes the victim by denying her warranted assistance, 
thereby compounding the psychological harm caused her by her· 
father's conduct.49 
D. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS 
Incestuous abuse frequently results in profound psychologi-
cal harm to daughters. During childhood symptoms including 
guilt, shame, anxiety, hostility and feelings of inferiority and low 
self esteem are common.80 The feelings of shame and guilt ac-
company daughters into adulthood, at which time other symp-
toms emerge. These include problems in interpersonal relations, 
feelings of isolation, mistrust of men and sexual dysfunction.81 
Women with histories of drug and alcohol abuse, prostitution, 
and abusive relationships with men are likely to have been in-
cestuously abused as children. 811 One symptom which appears 
with particular frequency is the woman's perception that she is 
different, an outsider, and that it is her own wickedness that sets 
46. BUTLER, supra note I, at 8-9, 37-38. 
47. In the past few years, as incest has become better understood, groups around the 
country have formed to respond to the daughter's, and sometimes her family's, needs for 
sensitive intervention. It is hoped that more such groups will be formed, since with their 
help, the experience of breaking silence need not continue to be debilitating rather than 
liberating for the daughter. 
48. HERMAN, supra note I, at 129. See also supra note 3. 
49. In addition, it acts to insulate the father even further from accountability for his 
conduct. 
50. DE FRANCIS, supra note 4, at 159-61. 
51. Tsai, Feldman - Summers and Edgar, Childhood Molestation: Variables Related 
to Differential Impacts on Psychological Functioning in Adult Women, 88 J. ABNORMAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 407, 414 (1979). 
52. One rape relief group reports that 35% of its victims had been incestuously 
abused. HERMAN, supra note I, at 30. Separate research indicates that of 136 street pros-
titutes interviewed, 25 % had been molested by fathers, stepfathers, or foster fathers. 
James and Meyerding, Early Sexual Experiences and Prostitution, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 1381, 1383 (1977). Twenty percent of the participants in a third study had exper-
ienced alcohol or drug dependency. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 99. 
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her apart.1i3 Because she considers herself to be evil, the daugh-
ter perceives the incest and later rapes or beatings as deserved 
punishment.1i4 This then, is the legacy of the daughter: robbed of 
childhood by maternal disability and robbed of innocence by pa-
ternal depravity. 
II. THE TORT THEORIES 
The incest victim/survivor has much to gain by pursuing a 
civil action for damages against her father. Confronting him in 
court, although intensely emotional for her, can be empower-
ing.1i1i More important, a successful litigant receives direct com-
pensation for the harm done her. liS In addition, should she pre-
vail, the daughter witnesses the court place the blame for the 
incestuous abuse squarely on her father's shoulders. Ii., To the ex-
tent that punitive damages are awarded, the blameworthiness of 
her father's conduct is emphasized. The daughter and her attor-
ney should balance these factors against the potential success 
53. Id. at 96-97. The author comments "[tlhe sense of being an outsider ... often 
reached extreme proportions .... With depressing regularity, these women referred to 
themselves as bitches, witches, and whores." Id. at 97. She concludes that this identity as 
fundamentally "bad," acts as a defense against the utter powerlessness most of these 
women experienced as children when dominated and overwhelmed by their fathers. Id. 
at 98. 
54. Id. at 98, 101-102. 
55. Telephone interview with S. Butler, author, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE supra note 
I, (Aug. 10, 1982). Although the incest victim/survivor participates in a similar confron-
tation if she appears as a witness for the prosecution in a criminal proceeding, the psy-
chological dynamic is quite different. In a criminal proceeding, the State confronts the 
father as an adversary, with authority· equal to his. The daughter's authority is that of a 
subordinate, just as it is/was at home. By contrast, in a civil proceeding, the daughter is 
her father's adversary. Her authority is equal to, if not greater than, his. This dramatic 
shift in power can affect the daughter's psychological recovery process. See HERMAN, 
supra note I, at 177-201. (The powerlessness experienced by incest victims is a recurrent 
theme in the literature on the subject. See generally BUTLER, supra note I, and HERMAN, 
supra note 1.) On the other hand, the confrontation has the potential of impeding the 
daughter's recovery process. Before choosing to proceed, both attorney and client must 
carefully consider the likely impact of the proceeding on the client. 
56. This is significant as compared with the benefit incest victims derive from suc-
cessful prosecution. When they file suit, most daughters are likely to be adults, living 
apart from their families. As such, prosecution resulting in her father's imprisonment is 
useful to the daughter only to the extent that her father has access to her. As an adult, 
living on her own, she has already terminated access and is no longer in need of the 
protection from her father which prosecution offers her. (Of course, if she has younger 
sisters living at home, their father's imprisonment will protect them.) Therefore, it is of 
greater benefit to her to seek payment from her father for the injuries she has sustained 
as a result of his conduct. This is best accomplished through civil litigation. 
57. On the issue of blame, see supra text accompanying note 18. 
9
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and emotional repercussions of this kind of litigation in deciding 
whether or not to file suit. liS Other practical problems might 
arise and must be included in the preliminary discussions be-
tween the daughter and her attorney. These include: (1) judicial 
reluctance to permit an award of damages where to do so would 
impoverish the father and/or his family and (2) the need for a 
guardian ad litem to sue on the minor daughter's behalf.1i9 If a 
decision is made to go forward with the case, at least four causes 
of action can be alleged. 
A. THE INTENTIONAL TORT THEORIES 
1. Intent 
Of the three intentional tort theories available to the daugh-
ter, two require proof that her father acted intentionally, that is, 
either purposefully to cause, or with knowledge that his conduct 
was substantially certain to cause, specific results prescribed by 
law.60 These results are different with respect to each of the two 
theories. As to assault, intent is established if the father ap-
proached his daughter with the purpose of causing her reasona-
bly to believe that harmful or offensive contact with him was 
imminent, or with knowledge that his daughter was substantially 
certain to have such a reasonable belief.61 A cause of action in 
58. In two suits daughters have won against their fathers since 1975, damages 
awarded have been substantial. See Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) in 
which a step-daughter was awarded $42,000 in damages against her stepfather for sexual 
assault and battery; X v. Melder, 3 Civil 20125 (on appeal from the Superior Ct., Butte 
County, CAl in which a daughter was awarded $906,465 of which $300,000 was punitive 
damages. The case was re-submitted on Feb. 28, 1983. 
59. The author recognizes that these problems can exist and might act to deter cer-
tain daughters from filing suit against their fathers. Any discussion of these problems is, 
however, beyond the scope of this Comment. 
60. The third inentional tort theory, the intentional intlicton of emotional distress, 
requires a showing that the father has intentionally or recklessly acted so as to cause his 
daughter severe emotional distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46 (1977) 
which reads in relevant part "[o]ne who ... intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress .... " [d. 
An intent requirement alone would present the same proof problem the daughter en-
counters in establishing her assault and battery causes of action. See supra text accom-
panying notes 60-73. However, since the intentional intliction of emotional distress can 
be alleged on the basis of reckless conduct alone, the daughter need not prove her father 
intended to cause her severe emotional distress. Proof that he behaved in reckless disre-
gard of that probability is sufficient. For proof of recklessness, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 86-90. 
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 60, at § 21 which reads in perti-
nent part: §(1) "[a]n actor is subject to liability to another for assault if (a) [s/he] acts 
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battery requires a showing that the father approached his 
daughter purposefully to cause harmful or offensive contact with 
her, or to cause her to believe that such contact,was imminent.62 
If the father knew that such contact or apprehension was sub-
stantially certain to occur as a result of his conduct, tortious in-
tent can be established.63 
In view of the intent requirement for either assault or bat-
tery, a daughter will have to show that her father knew when he 
molested her that she would apprehend imminent contact and 
that such contact was offensive to her. It is the father's knowl-
edge of offensiveness which, at least in theory, poses a significant 
proof problem for the daughter. As discussed earlier, fathers 
perceive the sexual contact demanded of their d'aughters as im-
plicit in their paternal role.64 If questioned about this contact 
with his daughter, a father is likely to deny the incest or blame 
it on his wife or daughter.6& Although daughters characteristi-
cally invent myriad excuses to ward off sexual contact with their 
fathers, fathers persist in their sexual advances.66 A suggested 
reason for this is the father's "infantile longings for nurturance 
and care"67 which he seeks to satisfy through his daughter. In 
addition, one commentator concludes that the father must find 
the sexual contact itself so rewarding that it approaches an ad-
diction.68 This same commentator suggests that in some cases, 
intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other ... or an 
imminent apprehension of such contact. , .. " Further, "[a]n act is done with the inten-
tion of putting the other in apprehension of an immediate harmful or offensive contact if 
it is done for the purpose of causing such an apprehension or with knowledge that, to a 
substantial certainty, such apprehension will result." [d, at comment d. 
62. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 60, at § 18 which provides in relevant part: 
"(1) laIn actor is subject to liability to another for battery if (a) [slbe] acts intending to 
cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other . . . or an imminent 
apprehension of such a contact .... " In addition, "[i]n order that an actor may be liable 
. . , it is necessary that an act be done for the purpose of bringing about a harmful or 
offensive contact or an apprehension of such contact ... or with knowledge that such a 
result will, to a substantial certainty, be produced by [herlbis] act." [d, at comment e. 
63. [d. 
64. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. 
65. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18. 
66. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 86-7. The author reports that one of the women who 
participated in her study stated "I don't know why he went along with it, because I never 
responded. Every time I'd say 'Daddy, I gotto go pee.' You know, anything to get out of 
it." [d. at 86. 
67. [d. at 87. 
68. [d, The author points out that the father needn't fear any judgment of his per-
formance and that the secrecy required by the forbidden nature of incest heightens his 
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unhappiness manifested by the daughter contributes to her fa-
ther's enjoyment of his sexual contact with her.69 She concludes 
that these fathers are motivated by power and dominance rather 
than sexual pleasure.7o The preceding profile is not that of a 
man who knows that his daughter is likely to find his behavior 
offensive, but rather depicts a man so self absorbed as to be to-
tally oblivious to her probable response. This mental state, 
therefore, does not conform to that required to establish intent. 
Ultimately, it is for the jury to decide whether the intent 
requirement has been met. It might choose to disbelieve the fa-
ther or, if it believes him, to conclude that his purported igno-
rance of his daughter's probable reaction is indicative of in-
sanity. Although at first blush this conclusion would seem to 
provide the father with a defense, at common law, and by stat-
ute in California, insane persons are held liable for their tortious 
acts.71 
The jury, then, has three possible alternatives: (1) it can 
disbelieve the father; (2) it can believe him but find his percep-
tions so bizarre as to constitute a form of insanity; or (3) it can 
believe him without any question of the reasonableness of his 
perceptions. It is only the last of these alternatives which would 
undermine the daughter's case. However, in cases of sexual bat-
tery between non-related men and women, courts have awarded 
damages with little or no discussion of tortious intent.72 In addi-
excitement. Finally, any detrimental consequences of his behavior are suffered by his 
daughter, not him. 
69.ld. 
70. Id. One researcher who interviewed convicted incest offenders concluded that 
their behavior was indicative of hostility to all women, acted out on those women least 
capable of retaliation, their daughters. Cavallin, supra note 20, at 1137. 
71. McGuire v. Almy, 297 Mass. 323, 8 N.E.2d 760 (1937) in which defendant struck 
plaintiff, a registered nurse hired to care for defendant (whom plaintiff knew to be in-
sane), with the leg of a highboy when plaintiff entered the room to attempt to remove 
furniture defendant had broken during a fit. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 41 (West 1982) 
which reads in relevant part: "[a) ... person of unsound mind, of whatever degree, is 
civilly liable for any wrong done by [her/him) .... " 
By way of speculation, if one accepts researchers' conclusions that incestuous abuse 
is wide-spread (see supra note 1), that it is a by-product of structuring one's family to 
rigid patriarchal standards (see supra note 10), and that a jury might find incestuously 
abusive fathers to be insane, one is compelled to conclude that extreme patriarchy 
breeds insanity in men. Therefore, since modern society is predominantly patriarchal, 
untold numbers of its male members must be insane. 
72. See e.g. Skousen v. Nidy, 90 Ariz. 215, 367 P.2d 248 (1961) in which plaintiff's 
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tion, the two daughters who have brought suit to date have pre-
vailed on intentional tort theories.7s This indicates that although 
the law as pronounced in texts and scholarly commentaries re-
quires proof of'specific elements of a cause of action, as a practi-
cal matter, where courts are persuaded of the validity of plain-
tiff's claim, actual proof of these elements may be waived. 
Nevertheless, daughters cannot take the risk that their claims 
will similarly persuade courts to forego any discussion of pater-
nal intent and should be prepared to offer proof of that intent. 
2. Assault 
Daughters, like all others, have an actionable right to be 
free from the intentionally inflicted, reasonably held apprehen-
sion of imminent, unwanted offensive contact.74 When a father 
approaches his daughter, without her consent, intending711 to 
cause this apprehension in her, he is liable for civil assault.76 In-
cestuously abusive fathers ordinarily seek frequent sexual con-
tact with their daughters for an extended period of time.77 As a 
result, a pattern of paternal behavior is established which the 
daughter dreads.78 From this pattern, the daughter is likely to 
employer (defendant) was held to answer for constructive discharge because of his re-
peated "indecent assaults" upon plaintiff. Without mention of intent, the court con-
cluded that plaintiff stated a good cause of action for assault and battery. In cases per-
mitting damages for attempted rape, courts have noted without any indication as to 
what a showing of tortious intent requires, that proof of intent to rape is unnecessary to 
prove tortious intent. See e.g. Lutterman v. Romey, 121 N.W. 1040 (1909) in which de-
fendant was held liable for assault and battery upon plaintiff whom he had touched sex-
ually without her consent. In cases alleging rape of a minor, courts have focused on the 
issue of plaintiff's legal inability to consent in awarding damages to her. See e.g. Altman 
v. Eckermann, 132 S.W. 523 (1910) in which defendant raped his thirteen old ward. The 
court stated "the touching of her person with the intent to injure her, she being incapa-
ble of giving her consent thereto, constituted an assault. Surely it cannot be said that in 
having intercourse with a thirteen year old girl, the appellee had no intention to injure 
her." Id. Although the court concluded that defendant's conduct was intentional, its ref-
erence to "intent to injure" reveals the court's concern with something more akin to 
criminal than tortious intent. 
73. See supra note 58. 
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 60, at § 21 which reads in perti-
nent part: "[a)n actor is subject to liability to another for assault if (a) [slbe) acts in-
tending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third 
person, or an imminent apprehension of such contact, and (b) the other is thereby put in 
such imminent apprehension." 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 60-73. 
76. See supra note 74. 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 35. 
78. HERMAN, supra note I, at 84-86. 
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learn to distinguish between instances of paternal approach 
which presage molestation and those which do not. Therefore, it 
is reasonable for her to apprehend impending sexual contact 
with her father when he approaches her in a manner she recog-
nizes as similar to the manner he evidenced on previous occa-
sions immediately prior to molesting her. Her reasonable appre-
hension of imminent offensive contact, in conjunction with a 
showing that her father intended to cause this apprehension, 
suffices to establish his liability for tortious assault. 
3. Battery 
The interest protected by the tort of battery is freedom 
from intentional, unwanted, harmful or offensive contact with 
one's person.79 Contact sufficiently offensive to establish liability 
"[offends] the ordinary person ... one not unduly sensitive as 
to [her] personal dignity. "80 This measure of a daughter's reac-
tion to her father's conduct is, in essence, a reasonable person 
standard. That the aggregate of "reasonable persons" known as 
society has refused, until quite recently, to respond appropri-
ately to the persvasive problem of incestuous abuse is evidence 
that the "reasonable person" finds incestuously abusive contact 
odious. 
The daughter must allege that her father's contact was in-
tentional. Whether or not the father knew that his daughter was 
substantially certain to find sexual contact with him offensive is 
a jury question.8 ! However, with no discussion of tortious as-
sault, numerous courts have awarded women damages for sexual 
assault and battery.82 In addition, those cases iIi which women 
have been awarded damages for incestuous assault and battery 
79. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 9, 34 (4th ed. 1971) which reads in relevant part: 
"[t)he interest in freedom from intentional and unpermitted contacts with the plaintiff's 
person is protected by an action for the tort commonly called battery." 
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 60, at § 19 comment a which 
reads: 
In order that a contact be offensive to a reasonable sense of 
personal dignity, it must be one which would offend the ordi-
nary person and as such one not unduly sensitive as to [herl 
his) personal dignity. It must, therefore, be a contact which is 
unwarranted by the social usages prevalent at the time and 
place at which it is inflicted. 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72. 
82. See supra note 64. 
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were won with no discussion of tortious intent.83 It would seem 
that juries are persuaded by the repellent nature of the acts in 
question, and do not closely examine the literal character of the 
defendant's thinking at the time the act(s) occurred. This augurs 
well for daughters seeking compensation from their fathers for 
the trauma they have sustained as a result of incestuous abuse. 
4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Daughters have a protectible interest in freedom from se-
vere interference with their emotional tranquilty caused by their 
father's intentional or reckless, outrageous conduct.84 In order to 
establish that her father's incestuously abusive contact renders 
him liable, the daughter must allege that (1) his conduct was 
outrageous; (2) he intended to cause or recklessly disregarded 
the probability of causing her severe emotional distress; (3) she 
suffered severe emotional distress; and (4) her father's outra-
geous conduct actually and proximately caused her emotional 
distress. 8Ci 
Proof that her father intended to cause her severe emotional 
distress poses the same problem for the daughter that she con-
fronts in establishing the requisite intent for assault and bat-
83. See supra note 58. 
84. State Rubbish Collectors v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 337-8, 240 P.2d 282, 286 
(1952). In a suit for payment of promissory notes, defendant cross complained seeking 
damages for assault based on plaintiff's alleged use of intimidatory tactics to force defen-
dant to sign the notes. In this landmark case, the California Supreme Court held that 
because plaintiff's threats to ruin defendant's business and to beat him were outrageous, 
and the fright defendant suffered as a result of those threats was severe, plaintiff's liabil· 
ity for the intentional infliction of emotional distress was established. The court relied on 
an outline of the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress found 
in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 60, § 46, which reads: "[olne who by 
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional dis-
tress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to 
the other results from it, for such bodily harm." 
85. Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 394, 89 Cal. 
Rptr. 78, 88 (1970). Defendant insurance company was held liable for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress as a result of its bad faith refusal to make disability payments 
under plaintiff's policy. Defendant also sent threatening letters containing false state· 
ments to plaintiff in an effort to induce plaintiff to surrender his policy or to settle a non 
existent dispute to his disadvantage. Defendant conceded that its entire course of con-
duct was outrageous. Due to his disability, plaintiff was unable to work and defendant's 
refusal to pay him under his policy forced him to suffer substantial financial loss. This, 
in conjunction with plaintiff's knowledge that he was unable to pay defendant what it 
demanded of him, caused plaintiff to suffer from anxiety and worry sufficient to qualify 
as severe emotional distress. 
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tery.88 She must assert that her father sexually abused her either 
purposefully or with the knowledge that she was substantially 
certain to suffer severe emotional distress as a result.87 However, 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress permits the alter-
native pleading of recklessness to define her father's mental 
state.88 When a father incestuously abuses his daughter, his con-
duct is reckless if he knows or has reason to know of facts from 
which a reasonable person would realize that such conduct puts 
his daughter at substantial risk of suffering severe emotional 
distress.89 
Because his daughter is a child, a father knows that she is 
dependent on him for survival. He knows that her emotional 
well being is dependent on his adequate provision of nurturance 
and affection, and that she will obey him in order to earn that 
affection. Because of her extreme youth, he has reason to know 
of her inability to comprehend or deter his sexual advances. It is 
unthinkable that a reasonable person in possession of the same 
facts would fail to perceive the terrible risk of severe emotional 
harm to his daughter the father creates when he requires her to 
pay with her body for the affection and care she deserves free of 
any price. Therefore, a father evidences reckless disregard of the 
probability of causing his daughter severe emotional distress. 
Conduct sufficiently outrageous to establish liability for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress can arise from defen-
dant's abuse of his relationship with the plaintiff when that rela-
tionship places defendant in a position of authority over plain-
tiff, or gives defendant the power to affect plaintiff's interests.90 
86. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63. 
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 60, § 46 comment i which reads in 
relevant part: "[t]he rule stated in this Section applies where the actor ... knows that 
[severe emotional] distress is ... substantially certain ... to result from (herlbis] 
conduct." 
88. Id. "[The rule] applies also where [the actor] acts recklessly .... " 
89. Id. at § 500 which reads in pertinent part: 
The actor's conduct is ... reckless ... if [slbe] does an act 
. . . knowing or having reason to know of facts which would 
lead a reasonable [person] to realize ... that [herlbis] con-
duct creates an unreasonable risk of . . . harm to another 
[and] that such risk is substantially greater than that which is 
necessary to make [herlbis] conduct negligent. 
90. Id. at § 46 comment e "[t]he extreme and outrageous character of the conduct 
may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which 
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The father-daughter relationship is imbued with both these 
characteristics. Fathers have a substantial, if not total, degree of 
control over their young daughters' lives. In addition, if neces-
sary, they can compel obedience from their daughters with 
threats of terrifying consequences, which the daughters know 
their fathers can produce.91 Incestuously abusive fathers exploit 
the power and authority inherent in the parent-child relation-
ship which results in a profound corruption of that bond. It is 
precisely this sort of behavior that is contemplated by the re-
quirement that conduct be outrageous in order to establish lia-
bility for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.9s 
The daughter's emotional distress must be severe as deter-
mined by whether a reasonable person could be expected to en-
dure similar emotional distress.9s The duration and intensity of 
the distress can be considered in analyzing its severity.94 If no 
physical harm is alleged, some courts might "look for more in 
the way of extreme outrage" to protect against fictitious 
claims.911 
gives [her/him) actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect [her/his) 
interest." 
91. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37. 
92. For an early case assessing liability for emotional harm resulting from inten-
tional abuse of the type of relationship specified in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
46 comment e see Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926). A fifteen 
year old schoolgirl was accused by her principal of engaging in sex with several men. He 
threatened to send her to reform school unless she confessed. As a result, a confession 
was extorted from her and she suffered great emotional distress. 
It is useful to note the similarity of relationship between a school girl and her princi-
pal and a daughter and her father. In each case, the parties are an adult male and a 
female child over whom he wields tremendous power. The use of threats to ensure the 
child's compliance with the adult's demands is common to both. Of particular signifi-
cance is the traditional parens patriae role played by school authorities. The care and 
discipline of children normally exercised by their parents is transferred to school author-
ities by day. These striking similarities dictate that just as the school principal was held 
liable for his abuse of authority, so too incestuously abusive fathers must be held liable 
for their abuses of authority. 
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 60, at § 46 comment j which reads: 
"[t)he law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable 
[person) could be expected to endure it." 
94. Id. "The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered 
in determining its severity." See also Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 
App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970). 
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 60, at § 46 comment k which reads 
in pertinent part: 
Normally, seyere emotional distress is accompanied or fol-
lowed by shock, illness, or other bodily harm, which in itself 
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Daughters typically suffer from guilt, shame, anxiety, low 
self esteem, and inability to trust men or form satisfying rela-
tionships with their peers.96 These symptoms persist for years.97 
The daughter is likely to have suffered some physical distress as 
well, particularly if the sexual conduct with her father included 
vaginal penetration.98 The multiplicity of symptoms of emo-
tional distress experienced by victims of incestuous abuse, in 
conjunction with the length of time these symptoms tend to per-
sist, provide compelling evidence that the daughter's emotional 
distress is severe. 
Having established the foregoing, daughters must allege 
that their fathers' conduct actually and proximately caused their 
emotional distress.99 As noted above, research indicates conclu-
sively that daughters who have been incestuously abused suffer 
serious emotional repercussions. too Because it is their fathers 
who sexually abuse them, it follows a fortiori that their fathers' 
conduct caused their emotional distress. This conclusion can be 
substantiated by psychiatric testimony regarding the nature and 
cause of the daughters' emotional distress. tOt 
Fathers who incestuously abuse their daughters recklessly 
exploit their daughters' trust in and dependency on them. This 
corruption of the parent-child bond inflicts substantial and en-
during emotional distress on the daughters. As a result, their 
ability to lead emotionally healthy and rewarding adult lives is 
affords evidence that the distress is genuine and severe. The 
rule stated is not, however, limited to cases where there has 
been bodily harm; and if the conduct is sufficiently extreme 
and outrageous there may be liability for the emotional dis-
tress alone, without such harm. In such cases the courts may 
perhaps tend to look for more in the way of outrage as a guar-
antee that the claim is genuine. . . . 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. These symptoms conform to those 
listed as acceptable evidence of severe emotional distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS, supra note 60, at § 46 comment j which reads in pertinent part: U[e)motional 
distress ... includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, 
shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea." 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51. 
98. Incest victims commonly suffer shock, HERMAN, supra note I, at 28, which is 
considered bodily harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 95. 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 85. 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53. 
101. Since many incest victims eventually seek therapy (HERMAN, supra note I, at 
177), the daughter's own therapist, if willing, could act as the daughter's expert witness. 
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placed in jeopardy. Therefore, it is incontrovertible that these 
fathers are liable for the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
B. THE NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
The State of California does not permit insurance compa-
nies to indemnify their policy holders against intentional tort li-
ability.lo2 Therefore, if money damages are sought, daughters are 
advised to plead that their fathers' conduct renders them liable 
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. At least eight 
states, including California, presently recognize an independent 
cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress. loa 
California does not require proof of physical injury to substanti-
ate plaintiff's claim of emotional distress as long as serious emo-
tional distress to plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable conse-
102. See CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1972) which reads in relevant part: "[a)n in-
surer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but [s/he) is not 
exonerated by the negligence of the insured .... " See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 
1973) which reads in pertinent part "[a)ll contracts which have for their object, directly 
or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for [her/his) own ... willful injury 
to the person ... of another ... are against the policy of the law." 
103. Seven states which recognize the cause of action do not require a showing of 
physical harm. They are California (see Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 
616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) in which defendant hospital negligently diag-
nosed plaintiff's wife as having syphilis thus causing the couple to file for divorce.); Con-
necticut (see Montineiri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 175 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 
1180 (1978) in which the telephone company revealed plaintiff's telephone number to a 
stranger who used the number to locate and kidnap plaintiff. Because plaintiff failed to 
demonstrate that the defendant could have foreseen plaintiff's emotional distress, plain-
tiff failed to state a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.); 
Alabama (see Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981) in which 
a mother went into premature labor. Her doctor's failure to attend to her after receiving 
notice from the hospital nursing staff that plaintiff had gone into labor, constituted neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress.); Hawaii (see Rodrigues v. State of Hawaii, 52 
Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970) in which plaintiff's home was damaged as a result of 
flooding caused by negligent maintenance.); Lousiana (see Chapetta v. Bowman Trans-
portation. Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. App. 1982) in which plaintiff suffered anxiety and 
tension as a result of an accident caused by defendant's negligence.); New York (see 
Johnson v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 334 N.E.2d 590 (1975) 
in which defendant's hospital negligently informed plaintiff that her mother was dead.); 
Maine (see Wallace v. Coca Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970) in which 
plaintiff drank from a bottle of Coca Cola that contained a used prophylactic.) 
The eighth state which recognizes a cause of action for the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress requires a showing. that plaintiff suffered physical harm in order to 
recover. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982), a class action 
filed on behalf of plaintiff and 4,000 other DES daughters who had not developed cancer 
at the time the suit was filed. 
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quence of defendant's conductiO' and as long as plaintiff can 
demonstrate the genuineness of her emotional distress. 1011 This 
standard posits an objective measure of the father's conduct. 
Hence, his daughter need not prove that he himself perceived 
the risk of emotional distress to his daughter incurred by his 
conduct. Rather, she need prove only that the reasonable person 
in like circumstances would have perceived and avoided creation 
of the risk. 
Children are generally not capable of providing for their 
own physical and emotional well being.l06 They must rely on 
their parents for the satisfaction of those needs. This creates a 
tremendously uneven balance of power between parents and 
their children which renders children particularly vulnerable to 
parental abuse. Fathers exploit that vulnerability when they 
force their daughters to submit to sexual contact with them. 
Such conduct manifestly creates an unreasonable risk that the 
daughter will thereby suffer serious emotional distress. 
It is indisputable that incestuously abused daughters suffer 
severe emotional distress as a result of their fathers' conduct/O? 
the symptoms of which may be verified by expert testimony. No 
reasonable person should be expected to endure the emotional 
distress incestuously abused daughters typically suffer.l08 This, 
in conjunction with the reasonable foreseeability of emotional 
distress as a consequence of sexual contact with one's father, es-
tablishes the incestuously abusive father's liability for the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress. 
III. DEFENSES 
A. TIME-BAR ARGUMENT BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
In California, the incest victim/survivor must file suit no 
later than one year after the claims against her father have ac-
crued. l09 Traditionally, California courts have held that a tort 
104. Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835. 
105. 1d. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 821, 839. 
106. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
107. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
108. The Supreme Court of Hawaii has adopted this standard to prove that plain-
tiff's claim is genuine. See Rodrigues v. State of Hawaii, 472 P.2d 509 (Hawaii 1970). 
109. See CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 312 (West 1982) which reads in relevant part: 
Women's Law Forum 
20
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss3/3
1983] INCESTUOUS ABUSE 629 
cause of action accrues as of the date of injury.110 Strict applica-
tion of a date of injury measure of accrual bars lawsuits filed 
more than one year after the injury was inflicted. In recognition 
of the manifest injustice which results from barring suits by per-
sons justifiably in ignorance of their causes of action, courts have 
developed a "date of discovery" exception to the date of injury 
rule of accrual. 111 The basic postulate of the exception is that 
the statute of limitations can be tolled until such time as the 
plaintiff knows, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should know, of her injury and its cause.11I 
Courts have applied the discovery exception to cases in 
which plaintiff's injuries failed to manifest themselves immedi-
"[c)ivil actions ... can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, 
after the cause of action shall have accrued .... " Actions for assault, battery, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress must 
be filed within one year of accrual. See CAL. CIV. Paoe. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982) which 
reads in relevant part: "[a)n action for ... assault, battery, ... or for injury to ... one 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another .... " shall be brought within one year. 
See Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 83 Cal. App. 3d 38, 51, 147 Cal. Rptr. 565, 575 (1978) for 
the proposition that these sections govern actions for the intentional infliction of emo-
tionaldistress. 
110. See e.g. Lambert v. McKenzie, 135 Cal. 100, 103,67 P.2d 6, 7 (1901), in which 
defendant failed to pay plaintiff an amount owed to plaintiff under a contract formed 
between the two. Plaintiff failed to file suit until more than two years after defendant's 
failure to pay. The court held against plaintiff on the basis of his failure to file suit 
within the prescibed statutory period. In so holding, the court noted "[i)t is the date of 
the act and fact which fixes the time for the running of the statute .... [T)hroughout 
the law. . . it is the time of the act, and not the time of discovery which sets the statute 
in motion." Id. 
111. For a review of the development of the discovery exception in California, see 
Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: California's Discovery Exceptions Swal-
low the Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 106 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Accrual of 
Statutes of Limitations). 
112. Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 567, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 130, 131 (1969). Plaintiff's child developed cerebral palsy as a result of plaintiff's 
ingestion of diabenese during her pregnancy. Plaintiff did not find out until two years 
after she took the drug that it could have caused her son's illness. She filed suit within 
one year of this discovery but more than one year after she took the drug. In holding 
that her cause of action did not accrue until she discovered that diabenese might have 
caused her son's illness, the court stated "if there is some valid excuse for the ignorance 
[of the injury) ... the strict rule will not be applied." Id. As to knowledge of cause, see 
G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 25, 722 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 
(1975), a product liability action for injuries incurred through ingestion of oral contra-
ceptives. Plaintiff filed suit approximately six years after she last used the product in 
question. She failed to allege why, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, she could 
not have made an earlier discovery of her injuries. As a result, a demurrer to her com-
plaint was sustained with leave to amend. 
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ately upon infliction l13 and to cases in which plaintiff, though 
aware of her injury, suffered from impaired ability to ascertain 
the cause of her injury.114 In permitting plaintiff to invoke the 
exception, California courts require plaintiff to plead facts alleg-
ing "(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the circum-
stances excusing delayed discovery"lUI of her injury and its 
cause. 
In incest cases, the victim should be permitted to use the 
date of discovery exception. First, it is unlikely that she will 
know she has been injured until well after she puts a stop to her 
father's abusive behavior. The psychological injury from which 
she suffers manifests itself by various symptoms. 116 Some of 
these symptoms fail to appear until the daughter is much older 
than she was when the abuse began. ll7 More significantly, none 
of these symptoms by themselves are sufficiently alarming to 
compel the daughter to conclude that she has been injured. It is 
only when she perceives that she has been suffering from an ar-
ray of symptoms, all of which have persisted for an unnatural 
length of time, that the daughter is likely to suspect that she 
was injured. 
As to discovery of cause, daughters are led to believe, both 
by their fathers and society at large, that they are to blame for 
the incestuous abuse. ll6 Consequently, even though a daughter 
may know that she has been injured, until such time as she is 
able to shift the blame for the incestuous abuse to her father, it 
will be impossible for her to realize that his behavior caused her 
psychological disorders. As with discovery of injury, discovery of 
cause can take years. In addition, precisely because incestuous 
113. See Young v. Clinchfield R.R. Co., 288 F.2d 499, 502 (4th Cir. 1961). Plaintiff, a 
locomotive fireman, contracted silicosis during the course of his employment with defen-
dant. The court stated "[some) types of injuries are not immediately detectable. Since 
the effects are usually long delayed, the victim does not know that [s/he) has been in-
jured till [s/he) observes definite symptoms referrable to the injury." Id. 
114. See e.g. Warrington, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 571, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Because 
defendant had represented to plaintiff's doctor that diabenese was perfectly safe, plain-
tiff's ability to learn the cause of her injuries was substantially impaired. 
115. See G.D. Searle, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 25, 722 Cal. Rptr. at 220. 
116. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
117. [d. 
118. [d. See also supra note 18 and accompanying text and note 46 and accompany-
ing text. 
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abuse is poorly understood by society and because the injuries it 
engenders are psychological, professional intervention may be 
required before the daughter can discover her injury and its 
cause. This too contributes to delayed discovery. 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the daughter can meet her 
burden of proof so that she falls within the discovery exception 
to the date of injury rule of accrual. There are additional argu-
ments available to the daughter, however, sufficient to convince 
a reluctant court that her's is an appropriate case in which to 
apply the exception. The modern trend is toward expanded ap-
plication of the discovery exception. lIB The traditional policy 
justification for application of the statute of limitation, protec-
tion of defendants from "the threat of liability for deeds in the 
distant past,"120 is singularly unpersuasive. Incest victim/survi-
vors have been harmed as a result of a most egregious violation 
of the parent/child relationship. In addition, society and the of-
fending fathers conspire to keep the daughter in coerced si-
lence.121 As a result, the daughter is doubly victimized, first by a 
father who sexually abuses her and second by a society that 
holds her responsible for her own victimization. To protect her 
father at her expense works an intolerable perversion of justice. 
B. CONSENT 
Plaintiff's consent to intentionally tortious conduct insu-
lates a defendant from liability for that conduct.122 Therefore, 
daughters must anticipate that their fathers will attempt to 
avoid liability for their incestuously abusive behavior by alleging 
that their daughters willingly participated in the incestuous con-
tact. Several compelling arguments available to daughters negate 
their fathers' claims of consent. First, as a matter of law, chil-
dren are incapable of consenting to intentional invasions of their 
legally protected interests.123 On the average, incestuous abuse 
119. See Warrington, 274 Cal. App. 2d at 567, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 132. "There appears 
to be a definite trend toward the discovery rule and away from the strict rule in respect 
of the time for the accrual of the cause of action for personal injuries." [d. 
120. See Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations, supra note 111, at 118. 
121. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. 
122. PROSSER, supra note 79, § 18 at 101. "As to intentional invasions of the plain-
tiffs interests, [her/hisJ consent negatives the wrongful element of the defendant's act, 
and prevents the existence of a tort." 
123. [d. at § 18, p. 102 which reads in relevant part: "[iJf the plaintiff is known to be 
incapable of giving consent because of infancy ... [her/hisJ failure to object, or even 
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commences when the daughter is approximately nine years old, 
but the incidence of onset at a much earlier age is not uncom-
mon. l24 This, in conjunction with the fact that incestuous abuse 
constitutes intentionally tortious conduct, renders daughters in-
capable in the eyes of the law of giving such consent. 1211 
In addition, daughters are psychologically incapable of con-
senting. Implicit in the concept of consent is freedom of choice. 
The unequal power between daughter and father predisposes 
her to acquiesce in his demands and precludes her exercise of 
free choice.128 Daughters are also unable to understand the 
meaning of the sexual contact forced on them which further re-
stricts their capacity to consent to it.127 
Finally, should intercourse between them take place, statu-
tory rape laws protect the daughter from her father's claim that 
she consented to the intercourse, provided she was under the 
statutorily imposed age of consent when the intercourse 
occurred. 128 
Consent is a smokescreen used by the father to induce the 
court to accept his contention that his daughter seduced him. 
That he raises the defense at all is indicative of the degree to 
[her/his) active manifestation of consent will not protect the defendant." 
124. HERMAN, supra note I, at 84. 
125. See Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980), in which a 16-year-old-girl 
was sexually abused by her stepfather from her ninth year until her sixteenth when she 
left home. In response to the defendant's allegations that she consented to the incestuous 
abuse, the court observed that "because she was a minor [she was) incapable of giving 
consent to acts of this nature." [d. at 40. 
[d. 
126. HERMAN, supra note I, at 27. The author comments 
Adults have more power than children . . . Children are es-
sentially a captive population, totally dependent upon their 
parents or other adults for their basic needs. Thus they will do 
whatever they perceive to be necessary to preserve a relation-
ship with their caretakers .... [T)he tinal choice in the mat-
ter of sexual relations between adults and children rests with 
the adult. 
127. BUTLER, supra note I, at 30. 
128. See Gaither v. Meacham, 214 Ala. 343, 344-5, 108 So. 2, 3 (1926) in which 
plaintiff, a 15 year old girl, was raped by defendant. In holding that she was incapable of 
consenting to intercourse because of her age, the court stated "we hold it is the policy of 
the law to protect the person of the girl of immature years and discretion against the 
lusts of men; that she is incapable of giving consent to illicit intercourse .... " [d. 
Women's Law Forum 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss3/3
1983] INCESTUOUS ABUSE 633 
which the father refuses to acknowledge his responsibility for his 
daughter's injuries. Rejection of this defense by courts and com-
mentators alike, however, is evidence that, beyond a certain 
point, society will not indulge the father's attempts to evade re-
sponsibility for his conduct and its harmful consequences. 
C. PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY 
It is likely that fathers will raise a parent-child immunity 
argument to evade liability for their incestuously abusive con-
duct. Extension of immunity to this type of paternal conduct is 
completely inappropriate. The doctrine of parent-child immu-
nity protects a parent from liability for personal injuries in-
flicted on his minor children. 11l9 The doctrine was judicially es-
tablished in the United States in 1891130 and by 1905 it was 
considered established law. lSI Since its inception, it has received 
much criticism and courts have drastically limited its scope.18lI 
129. Incestuous abuse occurs when the daughters are minors. Therefore, despite the 
fact that many daughters will not sue until after they have reached majority, parent-
child immunity can be raised as a defense. 
130. Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). A daughter sued her mother for 
wrongfully imprisoning her in an insane asylum. Without reference to any statute or case 
law, the court concluded that: 
ld. at 887. 
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, 
and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of 
families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor 
child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to 
civil redress for the personal injuries suffered at the hands of 
the parent. 
131. In 1903, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 
664 (Tenn. 1903), dismissed a suit in which a child sued a parent and a stepparent for 
cruel and inhuman conduct. The court based its dismissal on the rule of parent-child 
immunity for which it could cite only to Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). 
Despite the obvious lack of substantial precedent for its decision, the court called the 
doctrine "well settled law." 77 S.W. at 665. 
In the third case in the trilogy establishing parent-child immunity in the area of 
personal injury, Roller v. Roller, 79 P.788 (Wash. 1905), the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton denied recovery to a 15 year old girl whose father had been convicted of raping her. 
It is peculiarly ironic that one of the cases primarily responsible for fixing parent-child 
immunity as established law should have precisely the same facts as to which it is now 
urged that that immunity be abandoned. 
132. Many jurisdictions have abrogated the doctrine altogether in cases in which 
children are injured in car accidents as a result of their parents' negligent driving. See 
e.g. Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980); see also Hebel v. Hebel, 435 
P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967). Other jurisdictions have abolished the doctrine as to all causes of 
action in negligence. See e.g. Gelbam v. Gelbam, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 245 
N.E.2d 192 (1969); see also Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966). Certain 
jurisdictions have abolished the doctrine in negligence causes of action with two excep-
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In California, the doctrine is not applied to willful or malicious 
torts,133 and is also not applied to negligence actions except 
where the parental conduct complained of conforms to a reason-
ably prudent parent standard. 134 
In deciding cases on the basis of public policy, courts have 
been concerned that suits by minor children against their par-
ents would disrupt family harmony and interfere with a parent's 
duty to care for and discipline her/his children.l3II Where family 
tions: (1) negligent acts involving reasonable exercise of parental discipline and (2) negli-
gent acts within the scope of ordinary parental discretion with respect to provisions for 
the care and necessities of the child. See e.g. Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 
1963); see also Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981). Other jurisdictions have 
abolished the doctrine absolutely. See e.g. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 
(1971); see also Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974). For a discussion of 
the history of exceptions to the doctrine of parent-child immunity, see Hebel v. Hebel, 
435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967). 
133. See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) in which a minor 
child who had been driving for several hours on unfamiliar roads at excessive speeds fell 
asleep causing an accident in which his minor sisters were injured. His father, a passen-
ger in the car, was aware of the boy's condition and did not compel him either to slow 
down or permit someone else to drive. The court held that the father's conduct was 
wilful, and therefore did not permit him to invoke the doctrine of parent-child immunity 
to shield himself from liability to his minor daughters for their injuries. 
134. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) in 
which a father and his minor son were towing a jeep at night. The father stopped the car 
and asked the son to straighten out the jeep's wheels. In 'so doing, the son was struck by 
another car and injured. The court held that parents have a duty to exercise authority 
over their minor children but that such prerogative "must be exercised within reasonable 
limits .... we think the proper test of a parent's conduct is this: What would an ordina-
rily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?" Id. at 921, 479 
P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. 
135. Although these two policy reasons are of principal concern to courts, two other 
policy reasons are cited: (1) protection of family assets and (2) the danger of fraud and 
collusion between parent and child. See Parental Immunity - The First District De-
clines to Adopt the Doctrine of Parental Immunity, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 185, 194 
(1982). 
See also Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930) in which a child em-
ployed by his father was injured during the course of his employment. The court held 
that because the relational context in which the injury occurred was not that of parent 
and child, the father could not invoke parent-child immunity. In a particularly insightful 
analysis of the development and applicability of parent-child immunity, the court noted 
that the doctrine did not exist at common law and that an appropriate evaluation of a 
minor child's right to sue her/his parent(s) begins with that child's "general right to 
demand reparations." Id. at 354, 150 A. at 906. The court noted that denial of recovery is 
not based on a perception that the parent was innocent of wrongdoing, nor even that 
such wrongdoing was excused; rather, the parent escapes liability because "it has been 
thought that a right of recovery would lead to worse results" than denial thereof. Id. at 
362, 150 A. at 910. The court concluded that the immunity should exist only when to 
permit trial of the suit would result in disruption of family harmony or interfere with 
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harmony and reasonable parental disciplinary and caretaking 
discretion are not jeopardized, however, a minor child's suit 
against her parent has been permitted.136 Family harmony in the 
incestuously abusive family, if it exists at all, is purely superfi-
cial. "Harmony" in these families encompasses no more than co-
existence in the same dwelling, and is predicated on a father-
daughter alliance which depends for its survival on secrecy and 
fundamental corruption of the parent-child relationship. To the 
extent that any real harmony existed in the family prior to the 
onset of the father's incestuous abuse, his conduct unilaterally 
destroyed that harmony. Therefore, it is difficult to contend that 
by filing suit against their fathers, incestuously abused daugh-
ters disrupt family harmony. Furthermore, one cannot rationally 
conclude that incestuous abuse protects a father's discretion rea-
sonably to discipline or to maintain and care for his daughter. 
It is dishonest for any father to defend his incestuously abu-
sive conduct as a legitimate exercise of parental authority or to 
claim that his daughter's action in filing suit threatens to dis-
rupt family harmony. Nonetheless, daughters must anticipate 
that their fathers will make these arguments. However, as the 
foregoing illustrates, assertion of parent-child immunity in these 
cases is untenable. 
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Incestuously abused daughters may recover punitive dam-
ages from their fathers.13'1 The dual purpose of punitive damages 
is to punish the defendant and to deter the defendant and 
others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. 138 In Cali-
reasonable parental discipline. Id. at 372, 150 A. at 915. The court obliquely criticized 
the Washington Supreme Court for its decision in Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 
1905), when it commented that "[t)he father who ... outrages his daughter ought not to 
be heard to plead his parenthood and the peace of the home as answer to an action 
seeking compensation for the wrong." Dunlap 84 N.H. at 361, 150 A. at 910. 
136. See supra note 135. 
137. The daughter and her attorney must first consider whether an award of puni-
tive damages will bankrupt the father. If so, it is unlikely that a court will permit such 
an award to stand. In addition, public policy prevents insurance companies in California 
from indemnifying their policy holders for punitive damages levied against them. See 
infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
138. See Zhadan v. Downtown L.A. Motors, 66 Cal. App. 3d 481,136 Cal. Rptr. 132 
(1976) in which defendant wrongfully converted plaintiff's car when she refused to pay 
excessive charges for repairs improperly performed on her car. The court noted the prin-
ciple that "the purpose of punitive damages [is) to punish the defendant and make an 
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fornia, punitive damages are authorized by statute.139 To state a 
cause of action for punitive damages, daughters must prove that 
their fathers' conduct was malicious,1(O whereupon the jury has 
absolute discretion to determine whether or not to award puni-
tive damages. In 
Malice is statutorily defined as "conduct which is intended 
by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or conduct 
which is carried on by the defendant with a conscious disregard 
for the rights or safety of others."142 As has been discussed, in-
cestuously abusive fathers molest their daughters knowing or 
having reason to know that their daughters will certainly suffer 
injury.143 Thus, abusive fathers act with "malice" and their con-
duct warrants punishment. An award of punitive damages will 
also put other fathers on notice that incestuous abuse is unac-
ceptable behavior and thus, it is hoped, deter any further similar 
abuses. Perhaps where threats of imprisonment fail to deter, 
threats of financial loss will succeed. 
In determining how much to assess as punitive damages, ju-
ries consider the amount of compensatory damages awarded and 
example of [herlhim) .... " 1d. at 496, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 140. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3294 (West 1982) which reads in relevant part: "plaintiff ... may recover punitive dam-
ages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." See also Egan v. 
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979) in 
which defendant failed to properly investigate plaintitrs claim under a valid insurance 
policy issued to him by defendant. This failure rendered defendant liable for breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in all insurance contracts. The court 
focused its discussion of punitive damages on the deterrence function. 
139. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1982) which reads in relevant part: "[i)n an action 
for breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been 
guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice ... the plaintiff. . . may recover damages for the 
sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." 
140. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1982). Malice is defined as "conduct which is 
intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or conduct which is carried on 
by the defendant with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." 1d. at (c) 
(1). Conduct which is oppressive or fraudulent falls within the scope of § 3294. However, 
incestuously abusive conduct is best defined as malicious and therefore, fraud and op-
pression need not be addressed. 
141. Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 801, 197 P.2d 713, 719 (1948). 
The court stated '[t)he granting or withholding of punitive damages is wholly within the 
control of the jury .... Upon the clearest proof of malice in fact. it is still the exclusive 
province of the jury to say whether or not punitive damages shall be awarded.' 1d. 
142. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1982). 
143. See supra notes 74-108 and accol!lpanying text. 
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the defendant's wealth .... However, since California does not 
permit defendants to seek indemnification by their insurance 
companies for punitive damages,14& juries cannot include in their 
assessment of the father's wealth the value of any insurance pol-
icy he holds. If a jury's award of punitive damages is grossly dis-
proportionate to defendants' wealth and the amount of compen-
satory damages awarded, the court may overturn or reduce the 
award.146 Because incestuous abuse is particularly abhorrent 
conduct, it is possible that juries will be induced to make large 
awards of punitive damages. However, this should not deter 
daughters from asking for punitive damages, as excessive awards 
can be modified. 
Recently, two courts permitted jury awards of punitive 
damages to daughters who sued their fathers for incestuous 
abuse.147 It is anticipated that other daughters who present simi-
lar claims will meet with similar success. 
CONCLUSION 
Incestuous abuse, and its debilitating effects, is a grim fact 
of life for an alarming number of children and women in our 
society. Its occurrence has been only minimally checked by those 
in a position to guard against it, including the victim's family, 
her minister or rabbi, and child protective services. Daughters 
seeking societal vindication of their inherent right to freedom 
from paternal sexual abuse have been ignored, disbelieved, or 
blamed for the incestuous abuse. Those daughters who have at-
144. Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. 
Rptr. 389 (1978). Defendant was held liable for its bad faith refusal to settle plaintiff's 
legitimate claim under a valid policy. 
145. City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr. 
494 (1979). The court noted that refusal to permit indemnification is based on the pur-
pose of punitive damages. "[Tlhe policy of this state with respect to punitive damages 
would be frustrated by permitting the party against whom they are awarded to pass on 
the liability to an insurance carrier. The objective is to impose such damages in an 
amount which will appropriately punish the defendant .... " [d. at 42, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 
500. Obviously, defendants will neither be punished nor deterred if they themselves do 
not pay the punitive damages. 
146. Zhadan, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 499, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 142. 
147. See Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980), in which plaintiff was 
awarded $30,000 in punitive damages; see also X v. Melder, 3 Civil 20125 (on appeal 
from the Superior Ct., Butte County, Ca.), in which plaintiff was awarded an unprece-
dented $300,000 in punitive damages. (The case was resubmitted for an appellate deci-
sion on Feb. 28, 1983). 
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tempted to invoke legal protection of their rights have encoun-
tered a criminal justice system that prefers to protect the of-
fending fathers. However, tort litigation in this area may provide 
certain daughters the avenue to public acknowledgement they 
need in order to recover from the trauma engendered by the in-
cestuous abuse. 
Suing one's own father is not without certain specific practi-
cal and procedural problems. For example, the potential emo-
tional repercussions of this kind of litigation may inhibit some 
daughters from attempting it at all. In addition, daughters are 
unlikely to sue fathers with insufficient assets to payoff a judg-
ment against them. Those daughters who do go forward with 
their cases must anticipate the three defenses their fathers are 
likely to raise: consent, parent-child immunity, and expiry of the 
statute of limitations. Only the last of the three poses any seri-
ous obstacle to the daughter but it can, if unsurmounted, bar 
her suit altogether. 
These enumerated difficulties should not obscure the fact 
that there are definite benefits to be derived from tort litigation. 
For example, monetary compensation enables daughters to pay 
for the costly therapy many of them require to overcome the 
emotional damage resulting from incestuous abuse. Perhaps the 
greatest benefit inuring to the daughter from tort litigation is an 
intangible one, public designation of her father as the wrong-
doer. Its significance must not be overlooked. Coupled with this 
is the daughter's sense that she has overcome the powerlessness 
her father's conduct imposed on her. As one attorney recently 
commented, '[w]hat good does it do for the victim to have the 
father or stepfather put in jail? Damages can pay for some ther-
apy, and its some kind of compensation. [I]t gives [the victim] a 
sense that she [can] do something about [being abused]."148 For 
some victims, this is exactly what they need. 
Margaret J. Allen* 
148. Curry, How Incest Victims Are Making Their Fathers Pay, S.F. Chronicle, 
June 3, 1982, at 45 col. 1. 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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